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1.0 An Introduction to Disagreement and the Equal Weight View1 
Disagreement is rife, featuring in almost all areas of discourse.  Two friends might disagree about the 
time the film starts this evening, I may disagree with my fellow philosophers as to whether we should 
be internalists or externalists about knowledge, religious believers and non-believers disagree about 
God‟s Existence.   Some of these disagreements aren‟t troubling. If I‟ve recently checked the cinema 
timetable and my friend hasn‟t, their disagreement will have little effect upon my belief; I simply have 
more or better information than they do.  But if I think we have the same information, I‟d usually 
expect my friend to be as capable as I am in forming correct beliefs and there is nothing to make me 
think that in this particular instance my friend may be unreliable, what then?  Can it be rational to 
continue holding a belief when you know that others disagree with you?  If not, then how should you 
respond on encountering an individual who holds an opposing belief to your own? A spectrum of 
positions has recently appeared in the Epistemology literature, with the two main schools of thought 
roughly as follows: 
Conciliationism:  States that peer disagreement provides an epistemic reason to move 
your belief in the direction of your opponent‟s belief and/or suspend belief.  How 
much you are required to move depends on whether a weak or strong version of the 
position is adopted. 
Steadfastness:  States that peer disagreement does not always provide a reason to 
alter your belief.  It is therefore reasonable in at least some cases of disagreement for 
at least one peer to retain their belief. 
In this paper I want to undertake a detailed investigation of a specific version of strong 
conciliationism known as the „Equal Weight‟ View (EWV) as proposed by Elga (2007). My strategy 
throughout is to assume that the view is true and discuss what follows.  In doing so, I hope to reveal 
the counter-intuitive nature of the view when interpreted, as is common, as requiring that following 
disagreement, peers update their respective beliefs by taking a weighted average of their initial 
credences. In this opening chapter I briefly introduce the disagreement debate, differentiate three 
versions of conciliationism by motivation and then look in more detail at the EWV.  Chapter 2 
concentrates on the relationship between all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief.  The EWV was 
originally proposed on an all-or-nothing framework, but the majority of the literature and associated 
objections have characterised the view on a degree of belief framework.  I think it is therefore 
important to understand how, if at all, the two frameworks are related. I also seek to clarify where 
„suspending judgement‟ lies on the degree of belief scale. 
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Chapter 3 extends the debate to consider the epistemic significance of agreement. This will be 
important in Chapter 4 as in order to assess the effect of the EWV in diachronic cases we need to 
know not only how an agent should rationally respond to peer disagreement, but also peer agreement. 
I begin by arguing that in order for their positions to be consistent, conciliationists should accept that 
peer agreement should increase an agent‟s confidence in the truth of a proposition.  Next, I show that 
this is contrary to what the EWV (when applied as „splitting the difference‟) entails before suggesting 
that this mechanism for belief revision is not in the spirit of the EWV when applied to agreement 
cases.   
In Chapter 4 I consider a number of objections to the EWV when applied in diachronic cases.  This is 
an advance on the literature which usually restricts its attention to synchronic cases.  I will argue that 
diachronic applications of the EWV give the counter-intuitive result that what it is reasonable for an 
epistemic agent to believe at any given time, t, is contingent upon the order in which epistemic peers 
(and therefore, higher order evidence) are encountered.  Chapter 5 concludes the paper by bringing 
together the discussion from Chapters 2 to 4 and briefly considering possible avenues for further 
investigation. 
1.1 The Framework for the Debate 
The disagreement literature focuses on idealised cases concerning disagreement about some 
proposition, P, which is objectively either true or false.  To further simplify the debate, much of the 
discussion concerns one-off synchronic disagreements
2
.   
1.11 Epistemic Peers 
It is generally agreed that the simplest case of disagreement is one arising between two epistemic 
peers, each considering the other‟s judgement as good as their own. The majority of writers agree that 
to qualify as peers two agents must as a minimum satisfy EP1: 
EP1:   They have access to and are both familiar with the same evidence and arguments 
which are relevant to the truth of some proposition. 
Clearly, if you have more or less evidence available than your peer then you are not in the same 
epistemic position from which to evaluate a claim.
3
  EP1 isn‟t sufficient for peerhood however, and 
there are three ways in which writers have chosen to supplement it.  Kelly identifies peers by 
epistemic virtues:   
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 Note also that whilst in a sense, two people „disagree‟ purely in virtue of holding contradictory beliefs, the 
cases we are interested in here are those in which the agents are additionally aware that they disagree. 
3
 There is some debate as to whether this needs to be identical evidence, or whether similar evidence is 
sufficient. Additionally, it is unclear whether „evidence‟ here includes only the first-order evidence; evidence 
which relates directly to the proposition in question, or whether it also includes „higher-order‟ evidence, namely, 
evidence about what your peers believe.  I delay this discussion until Chapter 4, Section 4.4. 
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EP2:   They are equals with respect to the general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, 
thoughtfulness and freedom from bias. (2005, 176) 
Alternatively, some writers prefer a definition in terms of track record. Here, it is how reliable a peer 
has been in the past at assessing the evidence correctly which is important:
4
 
EP3: They are equals with respect to their track record in this area of discourse. 
Finally, Elga defines an epistemic peer as someone you consider that: 
EP4:  „conditional on a disagreement arising, the two of you are equally likely to be 
mistaken‟ (2007, 490).   
Whilst it seems to be assumed throughout the literature that Elga is also committed to EP1 and hence 
sameness (or at least similarity) of evidence, I would argue that this is in fact an open question.  
Suppose I am average in ability at mathematics and taking an undergraduate course and that both I 
and a mathematics professor (an expert) perform the same calculation.  Suppose also that I have 
similar examples to structure my answer, access to mathematical software and have also checked my 
answer against other people in my mathematics class.  The professor on the other hand just has a piece 
of paper and a pen.  I think it is plausible to say here that, conditional on disagreement, we are equally 
likely to be mistaken, as in effect, my extra evidence makes up for my lack of „natural‟ expertise.  If 
this is the case, then the mathematics professor is my peer regarding this calculation, despite our 
different evidence.  So whilst it is certainly true that two peers can qualify for EP4 by meeting EP1 
with either EP2 or EP3, this isn‟t the only way in which EP4 can be satisfied.  Having noted this 
point, for the majority of this paper I will just continue to assume that EP1 is a requirement for 
peerhood.   
A problem for accounts based around EP3 is that there may be a difficulty in certain domains in 
identifying a person‟s track record and/or reliability.  Whilst this is relatively straightforward in 
mathematical and scientific arenas, in other areas, for example philosophy, we rarely know what is 
objectively correct and so may struggle to determine an agent‟s past reliability.  For this reason, I 
think EP2 and an approach focused on an agent‟s virtues is often preferable.  However, my interest in 
this paper is Elga‟s (2007) view, and hence it is EP4 in the first instance which I will use to determine 
whether two agents are peers.  As a final point, there is also some debate concerning whether peers 
are those people who are in fact your peer or who you‟d consider to be your peer (although you may 
in fact be mistaken).  Whilst Kelly seems to favour the objective characterisation, Elga prefers the 
latter.  This seems correct. We are fallible, but can only be reasonable in being guided by our 
assessments of another person‟s ability, even if these assessments ultimately turn out to be incorrect.  
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To assume otherwise is to assume a falsely externalist perspective of peerhood.  I will therefore adopt 
a subjective take on epistemic peerhood for the remainder of the paper. 
1.12 All-or-nothing Beliefs vs. Degrees of Belief 
Another issue concerns whether beliefs are best represented in an all-or-nothing framework, or degree 
of belief (credence) framework.
5
 In everyday conversation we sometimes talk about how confident we 
are that something will happen. I may be highly confident that it will rain tomorrow for example.  On 
the other hand, we also speak of beliefs as unqualified; I believe that I live in Edinburgh.   Feldman 
(2006, 2007) and Elga (2007) present their views on an all-or-nothing framework where there are only 
three possible doxastic states; believe, disbelieve or suspend judgement. However, both Kelly (2010) 
and Christensen (2007) present their accounts using credences; the higher an agent‟s credence for a 
particular proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition.  Credences formally 
represent the strength with which agents believe various propositions.  They are usually represented on 
a scale from 0 to 1, with 1 representing absolute certainty in the truth of a proposition, and 0 absolute 
certainty of its falsehood. 
How exactly these two frameworks are related is a discussion I defer until the second chapter; for now 
I just want to motivate my reasons for adopting a credence framework.  Certainly we are familiar with 
the idea that we hold some beliefs more confidently than others; I‟m fairly confident that I‟m going to 
the cinema this evening, but I‟m far more confident the sun will set this evening.  A key motivation is 
disagreement cases in which one of the peers has already suspended judgement; prior to disagreement 
perhaps one peer is an atheist and the other an agnostic regarding the proposition „God exists‟. These 
peers still disagree in attitude
6
, yet it is unclear in this scenario how they should respond on an all-or-
nothing framework. One has already suspended judgement, is he supposed to suspend judgement 
again?
7
 You might say, why shouldn‟t the peer who has already suspended judgement not just 
continue to suspend judgement?  I think this is unsatisfactory as it results in the asymmetrical 
situation in which one peer maintains their belief (suspended judgement) and the other changes their 
belief (from disbelief to suspension of judgement). In effect, the belief of the peer who has suspended 
judgement counts for more.  Representing beliefs as credences also allows us to represent 
disagreements not only concerning all-or-nothing beliefs, but also disagreements concerning the 
appropriate credence to hold.  Two peers may both believe in God, and yet one with credence 0.7, the 
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take it that all are intended to refer to the same thing, namely, an agent‟s confidence in the truth of some 
proposition, often also understood as an agent‟s subjective probability in a proposition.   
6
 In this paper I follow Macfarlane (2009) in considering non-cotenability to be the hallmark of disagreement.  
On this view, I „disagree with someone‟s attitude if I could not coherently adopt that same attitude […] without 
changing my mind-that is, without dropping some of my current attitudes‟ (2009, 6). 
7
 This example is taken from Kelly (2010, 117).   
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other 0.9.  As I will argue in Chapter 3 there is at least one way in which this can be construed as a 
disagreement, and yet it cannot be represented as such on the all-or-nothing framework. 
1.2 Conciliatory Views Deconstructed. 
With these preliminaries in place, I now want to sketch a brief overview of the various conciliatory 
positions.  No-one in the literature suggests that peer disagreement should never have an effect on an 
agent‟s belief, rather, the differences stem from differing opinions on when a disagreement should 
affect beliefs, to what extent, and why.  Those inclined towards the more conciliatory end of the 
spectrum are often motivated by a version of the Uniqueness Thesis (UT): 
UT:  Given a body of evidence for a proposition p, there is a unique doxastic attitude 
which it is reasonable to take towards p. 
It follows from UT that if two epistemic peers disagree about a proposition, then either one of them is 
unreasonable in their attitude towards P, or their evidence differs.  EP1 prohibits the latter, hence, it 
follows from UT that at least one of the peers is being unreasonable.  In this paper I aim as far as 
possible to remain neutral about UT.  Elga (2007, 496) claims not to be committed to UT
8
 and as 
Christensen (2009) comments; it is an interesting and currently open question as to the extent to 
which conciliatory views are committed to this thesis
9
.  I will not attempt to answer that question here. 
1.21 Evidence of Evidence is Evidence 
Feldman (2006, 2007) proposes a strong version of conciliationism under which the only rational 
position for both parties to adopt in the face of disagreement is suspension of judgement.   He 
approaches the debate from an evidentialist perspective, whereby „[an agent] S is justified in believing 
[a proposition] P at [time] t if and only if S‟s evidence at t on balance supports P‟ (2009, 297).  Often 
this evidence takes the form of higher-order evidence; evidence about evidence. Feldman‟s main 
proposal is that if an agent learns that another person has evidence supporting a proposition, then one 
has evidence supporting that proposition oneself hence „evidence of evidence is evidence‟ (2006, 
223).  This principle concerns both the significance of first-order evidence, and also the existence of 
first-order evidence in the sense that your peer‟s belief that P is evidence that there is evidence for P.  
The latter is generally irrelevant in disagreement cases (given the assumption that peers share 
evidence) but is relevant to how plausible we take the principle to be.  Note that this does not mean 
that if I learn that you have evidence for P, I automatically obtain your evidence.  The key point for 
Feldman is that „the proposition that a peer disagrees with you concerning a belief is evidence against 
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the proposition you believe‟ (2009, 311).  As a result you should become less confident and suspend 
judgement. 
1.22 Disagreement as Evidence that you may be Mistaken 
Christensen (2007) argues for a slightly weaker version of Conciliationism, on which the 
disagreement of an epistemic peer gives evidence that one may have made a mistake in interpreting 
the evidence. As a result, an agent should become less confident in their belief.   So unlike Feldman, 
the evidence lies not in the content of the peer‟s belief, but instead in the fact of the disagreement.  It 
is the disagreement itself which is the evidence, whereas for Feldman, it is the reason why the 
disagreement occurs, namely, your peer‟s belief, that is the evidence.  The difference between 
Christensen‟s conciliationism and the EWV in the next section is that, whilst in some cases 
Christensen advocates something „close to‟ splitting the difference, he does not want to stipulate that 
in every disagreement with a peer, one should always split the difference.  Christensen‟s 
conciliationism is therefore the weakest of the three versions under consideration. 
 
1.23 The Equal Weight View 
Elga defines the view as follows: 
The Equal Weight View:  „Upon finding out that [a peer] disagrees, your probability that 
you are right should equal your prior conditional probability that you would be right.  
Prior to what?  Prior to your thinking through the disputed issue, and finding out what the 
[peer] thinks of it.  Conditional on what?  On whatever you have learned about the 
circumstances of the disagreement.‟ (2007, 493)
10
 
It follows that if your prior probabilities are such that you think you and your peer are equally likely 
to be mistaken then you should accord their view equal weight and therefore be no more than 50% 
confident that you are correct.  Throughout this paper I will interpret the EWV as requiring two peers 
who disagree to calculate a weighted average of their respective credences and it is this average 
credence which they are then rationally required to hold
11
.  To give a very simple example, suppose I 
believe that P with a high credence (0.8).  On the basis of the same evidence, my peer forms a low 
credence in the same proposition (0.2).  The EWV says that on discovering our disagreement, we 
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the two of you are in your respective answers (after the calculation, but before the disagreement), how absurd 
we find the other‟s answer (2007, 490). 
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should perform the following calculation in order to update our beliefs: (0.8*0.5) + (0.2*0.5) = 0.5.  
So both my peer and I should adopt credence 0.5 that P following our disagreement.  
Whether or not this approach accurately captures the spirit of the EWV is a question I will return to 
regularly in the following chapters.  Whilst not unreasonable in the sense that it is what the 
overwhelming majority of the literature takes the view to imply, it remains an open question as to 
whether Elga intended to be committed to this kind of „split the difference‟ strategy and if he did, how 
widely he intended its application.  However, there is some evidence in Elga‟s (2007) to suggest that 
this is how he in fact intended the view to be understood.  For example, when talking of steadfast 
positions, he describes these as views holding that rationality permits peers to be moved „less than 
half way in the direction of a peer‟s contrary assessment‟, thus suggesting that the contrary position, 
namely, the EWV, does have this requirement (ibid, 490, fn.20). 
The difference between the EWV and the other two conciliatory positions discussed is that the 
motivation for the position is prior to any disagreement arising; it does not arise from the 
disagreement itself, or from evidence about what a peer believes.  Instead, the sole motivation for 
being conciliatory is the thought that if you consider some to be a peer, then if you were to disagree 
with them, rationally you should assign their belief the same weight as your own.  It is the fact that 
someone is your epistemic peer that informs how you should modify your belief, not the disagreement 
itself, nor the content of your peer‟s belief.   
1.3 Motivating the Equal Weight View 
Elga‟s main positive argument for the EWV is his bootstrapping argument (2007, 486), which he 
motivates by consulting our intuitions in perceptual and mathematical cases. For simplicity, both 
cases discussed here involve disagreements in all-or-nothing belief. 
PERCEPTION:  You and I are walking down the street one day, and I glance across 
the road and think that I see our mutual friend Mike walking in the opposite direction.  
At the same time, you also glance across the road and think that you see our mutual 
friend James walking in the opposite direction.  I then say „Who was that across the 
street?‟ and you reply „I‟m not sure but I think it was James‟.  What should we do as 
the result of this disagreement?   
Suppose that I regard you as a peer in the sense of EP4 as we‟ve judged a number of similar 
perceptual claims in the past and I know you‟ve been right about as often as I have, despite some 
disagreements.  The thought behind the EWV is that when we learn that we disagree here, we should 
think that we are equally likely to be correct; we both have the same evidence after all. It seems 
obvious that in this type of scenario we should both abandon our original beliefs and suspend 
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judgement as to who was on the other side of the street.  Unless we can obtain further evidence, it 
would be unreasonable for either of us to continue to hold our belief.   
To see why, suppose instead that it is reasonable for me to be 70% confident that I am correct and 
hence 70% confident that Mike is on the opposite side of the street.  Well, for this to be true I would 
have had to get some evidence that I am a better judge than my friend; I would need some evidence 
which indicated that I have judged correctly, whilst my friend has misjudged.  But this so Elga claims, 
is „absurd‟ (2007, 492).  If I think I have got this evidence, then I can‟t think that we are equally likely 
to be mistaken, and hence you can‟t be my peer. In fact, suppose for reductio that over a number of 
similar perceptual cases, I think in each case I am 70% likely to be correct.  It follows that over the 
course of several disagreements I should become extremely confident that I have a better track record 
than my friend, and hence become extremely confident that I am the better judge.  In effect, I 
bootstrap my way to confidence, when in fact, simply comparing my response to my friend‟s gives 
me no evidence to think that I am correct.  In conclusion, it is never reasonable for me to be more than 
50% confident that I am correct in peer disagreements.   
Further support for the EWV is given by consideration of mathematical cases, one of the most 
discussed being Christensen‟s Restaurant Case: 
RESTAURANT: „Suppose that five of us go out to dinner.  It‟s time to pay the check, 
so the question we‟re interested in is how much we each owe.  We can all see the bill 
total clearly, we all agree to give a 20 percent tip, and we further agree to split the 
whole cost evenly […] I do the math in my head and become highly confident that our 
shares are $43 each.  Meanwhile, my friend does the math in her head and becomes 
highly confident that our shares are $45 each.  How should I react, upon learning of 
her belief?‟ (2007, 193) 
Again, it seems obvious here that both Christensen and his friend should both be less confident in 
their initial answers on discovering their disagreement.  They should therefore accord the two answers 
„equal weight‟, suspend judgement, and work through the calculation again.
12
   
1.4 Problems for the Equal Weight View 
Despite its initial plausibility, a myriad of objections to the EWV have been raised. These objections 
and responses have received much attention elsewhere in the literature so here I limit myself to a brief 
overview, with my own objections presented in Chapters 3 and 4.   
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 Cases like this provide additional motivation for considering non-cotenability of attitude to best represent 
disagreement (see footnote 6).  It is not obvious to me that the fact that an agent holds a belief that „the bill is 
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case of one agent believing P, and another believing not-P.  However, what is obvious is that „the bill is $43‟ 
and „the bill is $45‟ are non-cotenable attitudes. 
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A common objection is that the EWV if correct, and assuming that peerhood is fairly common (which 
it may not be), would require suspension of judgement in many of our beliefs across multiple domains 
which is seen to be neither desirable, nor realistic; many of us don‟t change our views in the face of 
disagreement, even with people we would acknowledge as our superiors. This objection is perhaps not 
as telling as it first appears. As discussed at the outset, the disagreement debate is concerned with 
what we should do in the face of disagreement, not what we in fact do.  It may be that the EWV just 
illustrates that we are over-confident in the majority of our beliefs.  
Kelly (2010) raises a number of objections around the claim that the EWV takes insufficient account 
of the actual relationship between the evidence and the resulting belief. If an agent who has in fact 
assessed the evidence correctly and formed a reasonable credence encounters a peer who has mistaken 
the force of the evidence, then the EWV says they have to split the difference.  This is despite the fact 
that only one peer had assessed the evidence correctly. The EWV therefore appears to ignore the 
asymmetry between the two beliefs, with the total evidence becoming ‘completely swamped by purely 
psychological facts about what you and I believe‟ (2010, 124, my italics). Hence the original evidence 
ceases to play any role in what it is rational for us to believe.  One concern with this kind of objection 
is that it operates from a third person perspective, one from which we can see which credence is 
correct.  This is not a perspective available to either peer; instead, all they have available is their own 
first-person perspective.  In a sense, the peer who correctly assesses the evidence here is unlucky. In 
virtue of encountering an epistemic peer who has misjudged the evidence he has to change his belief, 
moving away from the correct credence.  This is unfortunate, but ultimately correct, misleading 
evidence is still evidence
13
. 
The final objection considered here concerns a modification to RESTAURANT in which instead of 
$45 my friend comes up with $450; an amount greater than the entire bill!   Intuitively, it seems like 
you shouldn‟t have to alter your belief that $43 is the correct share in this scenario. Instead you should 
just be more confident than your friend that you have the correct answer, but this seems to contradict 
the EWV.  Elga‟s response is to remind us that your probability that you are right should equal your 
prior probability that you would be right, conditional on what you later learn about the circumstances 
of the disagreement.  The thought is that conditional on you disagreeing and finding your peer‟s 
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firstly, one is required to split the difference with epistemic peers, and secondly, one needs to have, in fact, 
responded appropriately to the evidence.  This is in fact the approach which Christensen (2011) adopts in 
response to this very objection. 
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answer insane you would think it was more likely that you would be right, so the EWV instructs you 
to favour your own answer.
14
   
A worry here is that Elga‟s response seems question begging.  Isn‟t the whole problem that we do find 
our peer‟s answers insane, and yet the EWV says we still need to give them equal weight? In „real 
world‟ cases it is often the case that we find our peer‟s view impossible to believe, but that doesn‟t 
mean that we just get to favour our own belief; it is precisely because they are our peer that we find 
their opposing belief so disturbing. Also, what if symmetry is restored; your friend finds your answer 
insane as well?  Amazingly, Elga just bites the bullet here. If conditional on us disagreeing and 
finding the other‟s answer to be insane we think it equally likely that we would be correct then we 
should just do as the EWV says and be conciliatory. 
2.0 What are Degrees of Belief? 
Having introduced the disagreement debate in the previous chapter, I now want to take a closer look at 
how degrees of belief (credences) are understood in the literature and how they are related to all-or-
nothing beliefs. The disagreement literature follows Feldman in assuming that „almost everything I 
discuss [in terms of all-or-nothing belief] could also be formulated in terms of degrees of belief‟ 
(2009, fn.1). However, as Christensen comments „there is no clear, uncontroversial way of seeing the 
relation between graded and all-or-nothing beliefs‟ (2007, 215). Are there then two different types of 
belief, one in degrees and one full? Or are they just two senses of the same fundamental notion, with 
one reducing to the other and in which case, which one is the more primitive?  A final question in this 
chapter concerns what it means to suspend judgement with regard to some proposition, P.  Whilst 
usually represented as being equivalent to credence 0.5, I want to argue that it is possible to suspend 
judgement in the required sense without having any specific credence. 
Although I will suggest that we should disregard any option which sees credences as derivative of all-
or-nothing belief, that is secondary to my main aim which is to sketch an overview of the various 
possible ways to understand their relationship and match the various candidates for „‟credence‟ to how 
the term has been used by authors in the disagreement debate.  This will be important in the next 
chapter as whether or not agreement is understood in terms of credence or all-or-nothing belief may 
ultimately affect its significance.   
2.1 Degrees of Belief as derivative of All-or-Nothing Belief 
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 Christensen has a similar response to Elga, in terms of common sense checking.  This kind of checking is 
much less liable to error than mental arithmetic and hence it is less likely that I am mistaken than my peer; I 
know my answer follows from a reliable form of reasoning, but I don‟t have any basis for thinking the  same 
about my friend‟s answer (2007, 201). 
11 
 
Although many writers recognise the duality of our talk about beliefs, it is rarely claimed that the two 
types of belief are in fact different in kind.  For this reason, this option will not be considered any 
further here.
15
  Let us then begin by assuming that all-or-nothing beliefs are the more fundamental 
state.  If true, what would we mean when we talk of credences?  One option maintains that we are in 
fact referring to all-or-nothing beliefs in probability claims.  So, to say that subject S has credence 0.75 
that it will rain tomorrow means that S has an all-or-nothing belief that the probability of rain 
tomorrow is 75%.
16
  Here is the attitude rather than the content that is unqualified.  
 
An immediate question then is; what kind of probability are we talking about; subjective or objective? 
In formal epistemology, degrees of belief are often defined explicitly in terms of subjective 
probabilities; my subjective probability that p just is my degree of belief that p. Hence as Christensen 
(2004, 19) comments, if degrees of belief are in fact all-or-nothing beliefs about probabilities, then the 
probabilities involved must not be understood in this way on pain of circularity.  However, if the 
probability under discussion is objective, understood as facts about the frequencies of certain types of 
event, then whilst we can have degrees of belief in single events it surely doesn‟t follow that we must 
also hold an objective probability for this type of event.  As Christensen comments, it would be odd to 
identify an agent as having a certain degree of belief in P with that agent‟s having an all-or-nothing 
belief about some non-belief related proposition about objective probabilities (ibid, 19). 
A further problem is that as we often attribute credences to agents who lack the conceptual 
sophistication required to form this kind of belief about probabilities.  Whilst we might speak of a 
child having more confidence in one thing than another, we don‟t think that children necessarily have 
the concept of probability.  Furthermore, even if we do think someone is capable of forming beliefs 
about probabilities, it doesn‟t follow that they necessarily have or are aware of a corresponding degree 
of belief.  Let us conclude this section by saying that whilst it is clear that people do hold beliefs with 
varying confidence, we should dismiss the thought that degrees of belief can be reduced to all-or-
nothing beliefs about probabilities and seek an alternative. 
2.2 All-or-Nothing belief as derivative of Degrees of Belief 
Arguably a better way to proceed is to consider degrees of belief as primitive, and ask what follows 
for all-or-nothing belief.  An obvious place to begin identifies an agent‟s having an all-or-nothing 
belief that P, with their holding a maximum level of confidence.  So to believe that P is to have 
credence 1; to believe that P is to be certain that P.  This requirement seems to strong; one can believe 
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 Interested parties can refer to Christensen (2004, 32) and Maher (1993, 134) for further discussion.  
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 A second option closely allied to the first identifies degrees of belief with all-or-nothing beliefs about the 
degree to which hypotheses are confirmed by the evidence.    On this model, if the evidence makes it 40% likely 




something in an everyday sense, without being certain of it.  For example, I might believe that I will 
go to the cinema later, but without being certain of it.  Relatedly, in terms of practical reasoning, to 
assign a proposition a degree of belief 1 is, on this account, to cease to consider the possibility it is 
false.  But surely we can believe something in an everyday sense without being prepared to stake 
everything on its truth?  It seems that all-or-nothing belief is not the same as maximum confidence. 
So what if instead we weaken the requirement and just state that all-or-nothing belief corresponds to a 
high (but not maximal) level of confidence, Foley‟s so called „Lockean Thesis‟ (1993, 2009).  Here, a 
certain threshold has to be reached for an all-or-nothing belief. We don‟t want to require certainty, but 
we also want to stipulate that we should be more confident in our belief than its negation hence our 
credence should be less than 1, but greater than 0.5 in order to qualify as an all-or-nothing belief.
17
 
Characterising the relationship in this way is not without its problems. As Frankish (2009, 80) notes, 
the norms of all-or-nothing belief are different from those of high confidence (Cf. Christensen 2004).   
All-or-nothing beliefs are usually conceived as being subject to conjunctive closure; we accept that if 
we believe that P, we ought to believe the conjunction of P with any other propositions we believe.  
However, if an all-or-nothing belief is equivalent to high confidence, then it will not be subject to the 
same rules. In fact, Bayesian principles suggest it is frequently rational to assign a lower probability to 
a conjunction than to any of its individual conjuncts.
18
  Despite this, characterising all-or-nothing 
beliefs in terms of credence exceeding a certain threshold does have the advantage that it fits best with 
the usage in the literature.   
Both Feldman (2006) and Elga (2007) present their views on an all-or-nothing framework which may 
constitute at least prima-facie evidence that they see all-or-nothing belief as primary. Other than the 
quote above, Feldman makes no further reference to degrees of belief in his writings and hence it is 
difficult to determine how he intended the relationship to be understood. However, we shouldn‟t be 
too hasty in drawing conclusions. Elga offers a more „general‟ formulation of his view in order to 
accommodate credences, namely that: 
‘Your probability in a given disputed claim should equal your prior conditional 
probability in that claim.  Prior to what? Prior to your thinking through the claim, and 
finding out what your [peer] thinks of it.  Conditional on what? On whatever you have 
learned about the circumstances of how you and your [peer] have evaluated the claim. 
(2007, fn.26, my italics) 
                                                          
17 An immediate benefit of this thesis is that it sidesteps a potential worry that it is too much to expect an 
individual to believe very many propositions with exactly the degree of confidence that the evidence warrants. 
According to the thesis a subject S can rationally believe P even if S‟s specific degree of belief is somewhat 
higher or lower than it should be, given S‟s evidence.  All that is required is that S‟s degree of belief falls above 
the threshold (Foley, 2009, 37). 
18
 Interested parties can refer to Christensen (2004) for a more detailed survey of objections. 
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Talk of probability here is ambiguous and arguably consistent with accounts appealing to (all-or-
nothing) beliefs about probabilities or credence as subjective probability.  However, much of Elga‟s 
work elsewhere is in the tradition of Bayesian Epistemology whereby credences are understood as 
subjective probabilities, hence taking these as primary is the more charitable interpretation. 
Kelly (2010) chooses to adopt „the standard Bayesian convention according to which the credence that 
one invests in a given proposition is assigned a numerical value between 0 and 1‟ (2010, 117).  
Throughout his paper he talks of the reasonable credence for a given hypothesis, H, being a result of 
the extent to which the evidence, E, confirms H. Again, this indicates an account which understands 
credences as primary with this interpretation fitting with Kelly‟s claim that „the [EWV] cannot be 
applied in full generality in a framework that treats belief as an all-or-nothing affair‟ (ibid, 117). 
Finally, Christensen states that although he doesn‟t want to commit to a particular threshold which 
corresponds to an all-or-nothing belief „it should be uncontroversial that the all-or-nothing attitude that 
it is rational to take towards P in typical situations is sensitive to the evidence which affects the degree 
of confidence it is rational to have in P‟ (2007, fn.28).  Christensen certainly seems to be suggesting 
that degrees of confidence are primary here, as he does earlier in the same paper when he says he 
wants to focus on degrees of belief as „evidence may change degrees of belief even when it doesn‟t 
change all-or-nothing beliefs‟ (ibid, 188).   
In conclusion, with the possible exception of Feldman, degrees of belief are taken to be primary to all-
or-nothing beliefs throughout the literature, with most writers equating an all-or-nothing belief that P 
with a degree of belief above a certain threshold, often at least tacitly assumed to be 0.5. 
2.3 Suspending Judgement 
If an all-or-nothing belief that P is equivalent to credence greater than 0.5, and correspondingly, an all-
or-nothing belief that not-P is equivalent to credence less than 0.5, then what of 0.5 itself? I want to 
end this chapter by briefly questioning how „suspending judgement‟, which here I understand as 
„neither believing nor disbelieving‟ should best be represented on a degrees of belief framework.  In 
the disagreement literature the majority of case studies presented take a form in which prior to 
disagreement, two peers believe P and not-P respectively with equal credence and hence following 
disagreement, their credences average to 0.5; they „suspend judgement‟.   
However, the EWV is not restricted in application to cases where agents have symmetrical beliefs of 
this kind.  Say for example that my credence that P is 0.9, and my peer‟s credence that P is 0.4; we still 
disagree about P (assuming that 0.5 is taken to be the threshold). Then the EWV says I should be 50% 
confident in my belief and 50% confident in my peer‟s belief.  However, this does not correspond to a 
50% confidence that P.  Instead, my peer and I should both have credence 0.65 that P following our 
14 
 
disagreement.    It is only in the special case where our initial credences average to 0.5 that both my 
confidence in my belief being correct and my confidence that P will be 0.5.  This indicates that we 
should understand suspending judgement in the first instance as referring to judgements about whose 
belief is correct, not whether P is correct
19
. 
That said, my interest here is to understand what it would mean to suspend judgement about P itself.  
So consider a case in which an agent‟s credence that P is 0.5 following disagreement, is this 
suspending judgement about P? Arguably, there is a difference between on the one hand actively 
believing that P with credence 0.5, because this is genuinely what the evidence supports, and on the 
other hand suspending judgement because either you have no evidence or due to recognition that 
whatever evidence you have is insufficient to support a precise judgement.  Surely having credence 
0.5 represents a positive commitment to a proposition being as likely as not to be true.  Suspension of 
judgement on the other hands seems to be more an admission that an agent just does not know what 
would be an appropriate credence. Huber demonstrates this distinction as follows:  
„Suppose Sophia has hardly any enological knowledge.  Her subjective probability for 
the proposition that a Schilcher, an Austrian wine speciality, is a white wine might 
reasonably be .5 […]. Contrast this with the following case.  Sophia knows for sure 
that a certain coin is fair [and hence] that the objective chance of a coin landing heads 
[…] equals .5.  Under that assumption her subjective probability for the proposition 
that the coin will land heads on the next toss might reasonably be .5.  Although 
Sophia‟s subjective probabilities are alike in these two scenarios, there is an important 
epistemological difference.  In the first case a subjective probability of .5 represents 
complete ignorance.  In the second case it represents substantial knowledge about the 
objective chances.‟ (2009, 8). 
I want to suggest that there are three possible ways to understand „suspending judgement‟.  The 
broadest notion following Feldman (2006, 2007) is that following disagreement both peers should 
suspend judgement in the sense that they just shouldn‟t believe anything about P.   They therefore 
have the full interval [0, 1] available to them as potential credences that P.  At the other extreme, a 
narrow understanding takes it as corresponding to a precise credence; 0.5.  However, the case above 
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 Kelly (forthcoming) on recognising that only in the „special case‟ will agents credences average to 0.5 
chooses to avoid the issue by simply defining a view as conciliatory „if and only if it entails that suspending 
judgement is a necessary condition for being reasonable in a canonical case of peer disagreement‟ (forthcoming, 
my italics).  He goes on to say that on a framework employing degrees of belief, this necessary condition should 
be interpreted so as to require a stance of agnosticism, and hence a degree of belief of „approximately 0.5, which 
is where proponents of the view think we should be‟ (Forthcoming, 6, fn.3).  This to me seems ad hoc, it isn‟t 
clear that proponents are committed to degree of belief 0.5 as being the appropriate disagreement outcome.  In 
fact, even if suspending judgement is a necessary condition for conciliationists, this doesn‟t entail a degree of 
belief 0.5 unless suspending judgement is just defined to be degree of belief 0.5. All conciliationists want to say 
is that we should suspend judgement regarding which peer is correct, not about P.   
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suggests that credence 0.5 fails to distinguish between cases of ignorance and cases where a subject 
has detailed knowledge about chances.   It also ignores the potential asymmetries in peer beliefs prior 
to disagreement; if I am highly confident that P, and a peer is only slightly confident that not-P, I will 
have to move my belief much further than my peer in order to be at credence 0.5. 
A more intermediate position follows the EWV and says that when two peers suspend judgement, they 
suspend judgement as to which of their beliefs are correct.  This doesn‟t automatically entail that the 
whole interval of positions regarding P is available, contra. Feldman
20
.  If my credence that P is 0.5, 
and my peer‟s 0.7, then perhaps on becoming aware of our disagreement we would accept that the 
correct belief lies somewhere in the interval [0.45, 0.75].  By suspending belief here, we aren‟t 
completely suspending belief about P, after all, the evidence we have does rule out certain credences, 
but we are suspending belief as to who is correct and seeking further evidence.  This seems correct, for 
example in RESTAURANT if I say the bill is $43 and my peer $45, we suspend judgement as to who 
is correct.  This doesn‟t entail however that suddenly every possible answer is on the table.  We might 
think that the correct answer lies somewhere from $40 - $50, we certainly don‟t think that $2000 is a 
contender.  I want to suggest that in cases of ignorance two peers shouldn‟t assign credence 0.5 that P, 
but instead to allow the whole interval from [0, 1] such that any number falling in the interval is a 
legitimate subjective probability for P. The size of the interval [a, b] reflects ignorance with respect to 
the proposition, the more evidence gained, the narrower the interval.  Where we have knowledge of 
objective probability, the interval narrows to [0.5, 0.5]. 
To briefly conclude this chapter, we have seen that the most promising way to unify talk of degrees of 
belief and all-or-nothing belief is to consider the former as primitive, with all-or-nothing belief 
corresponding to a degree of belief exceeding a certain threshold.  I have also argued that this 
presentation fits best with accounts in the literature.  Finally, we have seen that „suspending 
judgement‟ in an all-or-nothing sense, should not be represented as corresponding to credence 0.5.  
Instead, it should be represented as an interval, where the size of this interval is informed by both the 
agent‟s beliefs prior to disagreement, and the amount of evidence available.   
3.0 The Epistemic Significance of Agreement  
I now want to turn the disagreement debate on its head and look instead at the epistemic significance 
of peer agreement. Differing motivations aside, all three conciliatory views canvassed in chapter 1 
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 This intermediate approach is perhaps most obvious when we consider a larger group of peers who disagree, 
with a corresponding range of degrees of confidence.  Suppose that the majority of credences are distributed 
evenly around 0.2 and 0.8.  If we „split the difference‟ then the rational belief following discovery of 
disagreement becomes 0.5. But in the case described, the peers actually seem to have better evidence that the 
rational credence to hold isn‟t 0.5, but instead either 0.2 or 0.8, or somewhere in the interval between.  They 
should therefore suspend judgement that P, but without settling on any precise value.  A similar point to this is 
made by Thurow (forthcoming, 10). 
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entail similar rational requirements on an agent‟s belief following disagreement.   However, it doesn‟t 
immediately follow that all will similarly impose the same requirements following agreement. Despite 
this I think that it is plausible that all conciliationists should be committed to something like the 
following principle: 
AGREEMENT:  If you believe that P and learn that an epistemic peer believes 
that P, then you ought to raise your confidence that P. 
Whilst comments on agreement are few and far between in the literature, this does seem to be the 
default position.  For example, Christensen claims that if both I and a peer do a calculation and reach 
the same answer, this should make each of us more confident in our answer, further stating that „[he 
does] not expect these judgements to be very controversial.  Even most [steadfast] philosophers 
concede that, in cases like this, the disagreement of a friend should make me less confident, and taking 




After motivating AGREEMENT for both Feldman‟s (2006) and Christensen‟s (2007) respective 
accounts, my main aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that whilst the spirit of the EWV is consistent 
with agreement raising confidence, its usual application as „splitting the difference‟ is not.  When 
belief revision is understood in this way the view diverges from other conciliatory views and suggests 
that following agreement two peers should remain fixed in their respective degrees of belief. We 
therefore have reason to divorce the EWV from „splitting the difference‟ in agreement cases, which 
may in turn give some grounds for thinking that this method for belief revision should be disallowed 
across the board.  
3.1 How should Agreement affect Belief? 
I begin by modifying PERCEPTION and RESTAURANT such that the two peers are in agreement.  
So in PERCEPTION-A, both my friend and I agree that is our mutual friend James on the other side 
of the street, and in RESTAURANT-A, both my friend and I agree that the bill totals $43.  What now?  
It seems uncontroversial that as a minimum in each case both peers are reasonable in continuing to 
hold their beliefs on discovering their agreement, but should they in fact be more confident once they 
find out a peer agrees? 
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 There will be at least some cases where peer agreement should not raise confidence.  For example, if I know 
that my peer and I have both formed our belief purely on the basis of the testimony of the same expert, then our 
beliefs are not suitably independent of one another to count as new evidence.  If I were to count my peer‟s belief 
as evidence here, I would effectively be double counting the same evidence twice.  Nevertheless, there are plenty 




Consider Feldman‟s (2006, 2009) proposal that a peer‟s belief is new higher order evidence which 
directly supports or undermines the proposition, P.  In cases of disagreement, a peer‟s belief that not-P 
is evidence which counts against P, hence the requirement that we reduce our confidence in P 
accordingly.  What I want to say here is that in the same way, evidence that a peer believes P should 
be evidence that supports P. Hence I am rationally required to be more confident on learning of a 
peer‟s agreement and associated belief.  For example, in RESTAURANT, a peer has independently 
carried out the same calculation and reached the same answer.  This provides independent evidence 
and confirmation that $43 is the correct answer. 
To put this in a slightly different way, it is fairly uncontroversial in the testimony literature that, absent 
any defeaters, the testimony of a peer provides an agent with evidence that can be used to form a 
belief.  If I don‟t have any evidence relating to a proposition other than a reliable peer‟s belief that it is 
true, then I am reasonable in also believing that P; my peer‟s belief is evidence that supports P.  If this 
is the case then it would seem odd not to similarly count a peer‟s belief as evidence in cases where I 
also had other evidence.  In RESTAURANT, if I hadn‟t done a calculation, I would accept my peer‟s 
calculation as evidence that the bill comes to $43 a head.  The fact that I have also carried out the 
calculation doesn‟t entail that my peer‟s calculation suddenly ceases to be evidence.   In effect, the 
testimony of a peer provides new evidence in support of a new belief, and an epistemic peer‟s 
agreement functions in a similar way, but instead acts to support existing beliefs. 
On Christensen‟s account a peer‟s disagreement functions as evidence that I could be mistaken.  If 
knowing it‟s more likely that I‟ve made a mistake in believing P means I should be less confident that 
p, then knowing it‟s less likely that I‟ve made a mistake in believing p surely means I should be more 
confident that p.  To support this intuition Christensen asks us to consider a case where I have a very 
high credence (0.92) in some proposition, P.  My initial inclination was actually to be more certain that 
P, but I scale back my confidence a bit as I know I make some mistakes.  I then learn that my friend, 
an epistemic peer, has done the same sum, and become 0.91 confident in P.  „I suppose that we have 
arrived at our respective credences in the same way’ (2011, 6, my italics).  Christensen claims that on 
learning of my peer‟s high credence I should be more confident that I didn‟t make a mistake.  If that is 
true, I should raise my confidence beyond 0.92.
22
  Whilst it isn‟t entirely clear whether Christensen 
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 Note that Christensen‟s case relies to some extent on the fact that I think my peer has also adjusted his belief to 
account for fallibility.  If he had not, then perhaps Christensen would have to say that I should be less confident 
here as the EWV would suggest; I would have received evidence that I was over-confident.  Despite this, I do 
think Christensen is correct here that we do often adjust our beliefs in this way to allow for the potential of 
mistakes, either due to recognition of our fallibility, or perhaps because we don‟t think we have sufficient 
evidence to be more confident.  However, I am less convinced that as a result we would always scale down our 
confidence in P.  If there is a possibility I could be mistaken about the import of the evidence, then why think 
that this mistake would manifest itself in over-confidence, why is not equally plausible that I could be under-
confident that P, in which case, I should in fact raise my credence to compensate?  The basic point is that, whilst 
I agree that fallibility can only act as to reduce confidence in my belief forming mechanism, it remains an open 
question as to whether this should lead to a higher or lower degree of belief that P. 
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intends either i) the close proximity of the peer‟s respective beliefs, or ii) the fact that both exceed an 
unspecified threshold to be doing the work here, on either reading, it certainly seems plausible that the 
peer‟s agreement makes it reasonable to be more confident in this type of scenario. 
Unlike the other conciliatory positions, the EWV doesn‟t immediately say anything about peer 
disagreement providing evidence.   Instead, the motivating thought is that we should consider a peer 
to be as someone as likely as ourselves to be correct (or mistaken) in a disagreement.  This motivation 
is identical in cases of agreement. Regardless of whether or not we are agreeing or disagreeing with a 
peer, in determining the truth of some proposition, P, we should think that we are equally likely to be 
correct.  Elga does specifically comment on agreement to say that the more general formulation of his 
view (given in section 2.3) „governs ones response not just to cases in which your [peer] disagrees, 
but also to cases in which she agrees or suspends judgement‟ (2007, 296, fn.26, my italics).  This 
removes an immediate objection to my discussion so far, namely that as defined in section 1.23, the 
EWV only claims to say something about how someone ought to respond to disagreement
23
 and hence 
cannot be criticised on the basis that it gives an odd result in agreement cases.  Clearly Elga does 
intend his view to be fully general in its application. 
3.2 Two Types of Agreement 
Unfortunately, applying the EWV as „splitting the difference‟ returns a result inconsistent with 
AGREEMENT. To say that two peers agree that P is in the first instance to say that they share an all-
or-nothing belief.  It is a further question what credence(s) they assign to the proposition.  There are 
two options: 
a) Agreement in Credence and All-or-Nothing Belief: Both assign P the same credence, 
0.8 for example. 
 
b) Agreement only in All-or-nothing Belief:  They assign P different credences, 0.7 and 0.8 
for example.  Effectively, one is more confident that P than the other.    
Based on his reasoning in the case study in section 3.1, Christensen seems to be committed to both (a) 
and (b) being agreement; if two peers both hold credences greater than a certain threshold, then their 
agreement should allow both to be more confident
24
.  It seems uncontroversial that on any account (a) 
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 Thanks to Allan Hazlett for raising this concern in e-mail conversation. 
24
 One disadvantage of Christensen‟s approach is that, assuming for arguments sake that the threshold for all-or-
nothing belief is 0.5, he would be committed to two peers with credences 0.55 and 0.95 being in agreement and 
hence both being rational in becoming more confident that P.  However, two peers with credences 0.45 and 0.55 
respectively would count as disagreeing, despite the fact that in the latter case, the difference in credence was 
only 0.1, where as in the former case, the difference was 0.4.  Intuitively, the closer the proximity of the peer‟s 
beliefs, the more confident they should be that they are in the correct ball park as regards holding a reasonable 
credence given their evidence. 
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constitutes agreement; if this isn‟t agreement, then what is?  However, the result of „splitting the 
difference‟ in (a) does not result in an increase in confidence for either peer. Instead, both agents 
would remain at credence 0.9
25
. Even worse „splitting the difference‟ treats (b) in an identical manner 
to disagreement, with both agents moving to credence 0.85
26
.  Although one peer is entitled to be 
more confident that P following the agreement, the other has to become less confident.   The EWV 
when understood in this way seems to be more focused on difference in credence rather than any 
specific threshold as a guide to how peer agreement should affect an agent.  The result being that the 
EWV is on the face of it, surprisingly, incompatible with other versions of conciliationism in 
agreement cases.  
But is there is any interpretation of the credences in (b) which is consistent with seeing this as a 
disagreement?
27
 One possibility follows Macfarlane in claiming that, in some sense ‘I disagree with 
someone‟s attitude if I could not coherently adopt that same attitude […] without dropping some of 
my current attitudes. […] I disagree with attitudes that are not cotenable with my current 
attitudes.‟(2009, 6).
28
 If disagreement is understood as non-cotenability of attitude, then there needs 
be no single proposition that one agent takes a positive attitude towards and the other a negative 
attitude in order to disagree. Instead all that is required is a difference in credence.  Macfarlane‟s own 
example is as follows: 
„Ned, the weather reporter for Channel 4, has a credence of 0.7 that it will rain 
tomorrow. Ted, the weather reporter for Channel 5, has a credence of 0.8 that it will 
rain. Ned could not adopt Ted‟s attitude without change of mind, so we have a case of 
non-cotenability, even though both Ned and Ted take it to be pretty likely that it will 
rain. This is a kind of disagreement, though it is not the first thing one thinks of when 
one thinks of disagreement.‟ (ibid, 6)  
 
There seem to be two possible readings of this case.  The first takes the proposition under discussion 
to be P: „It will rain tomorrow‟.  On this reading, Ned and Ted‟s credences represent 70% and 80% 
confidence that P respectively. Here they do share the same attitude towards P, both think that P is 
true, and hence they are in agreement. The second reading however takes the proposition under 
discussion not to be P, but instead P*: „Given the evidence, it is 70% likely that it will rain tomorrow‟. 
Ned believes that P*, Ted believes Not-P* (instead believing that given the evidence, the likelihood of 
rain is 80%). I think this second reading is how Macfarlane intends us to understand the case; as one 
in which Ned and Ted hold non-cotenable attitudes.  On this reading, although both Ned and Ted on 
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 To see this, calculate (0.9*0.5) + (0.9*0.5) = 0.9. 
26
 To see this, calculate (0.8*0.5) + (0.9*0.5) = 0.85. 
27
 Though note, even if there is (a) still remains problematic. 
28
 Disagreement in all-or-nothing belief captures a special case of non-cotenability, one in which attitudes are 
limited to attitudes of full-belief.   
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balance believe it will rain tomorrow, we don‟t want this „agreement‟ to raise their confidence that it 
will rain, at least not in the sense of raising their predicated chances of rain.  If it did, then we would 
effectively be saying that our beliefs about the rain can actually directly affect the weather! Clearly 
my belief that it will rain tomorrow in no way serves to make this more likely.  
So on the second reading they do disagree, and hence splitting the difference would give a reasonable 
result; a convergence on 75% likelihood of rain seems plausible given their total evidence. However, I 
think that to read the case in this way would be to mistakenly fall into the trap of treating credences as 
beliefs about probabilities, something which I explicitly ruled out in the previous chapter. In effect, 
Ned has a belief that the probability of rain tomorrow is 70%.  But to be able to apply the EWV we 
would need to know the credence that he assigns to P*, not the content of P* itself. We need to know 
for example how confident Ned was that P*, and how confident Ted was that not-P*. Only then could 
we assess this disagreement by applying the EWV. In the disagreement debate, the target cases are 
those which follow the first-reading, not the second.  The moral of the story is that we need to be 
careful to ensure that in assessing (dis)agreement cases, we accurately locate exactly which 
proposition is the locus of the disagreement.   
In fact a closer inspection of the definition of the EWV in Chapter 1 reveals that it is consistent with 
agreement raising confidence.  The spirit of the view is just; update your credences, based on your 
prior probability that you‟d be right, given a disagreement.  So when it comes to agreement, you 
should update your credences, based on your prior probability that you‟d be right, given peer 
agreement.  And you might think that it‟s more likely that you‟d be right, conditional on a peer 
agreeing. Generally, it is more likely that two people are right than that one person is right.
29
  And 
hence, the EWV is consistent with becoming more confident following agreement.
30
  The problems 
discussed in this chapter therefore seem to lie not with the view itself, but with its common 
interpretation as requiring a split-the-difference approach.  
In conclusion the EWV cannot be applied as weighted averaging in agreement cases, at least if 
agreement is defined in terms of sharing a credence above a threshold. It is plausible, or at least 
desirable that any method for belief revision should be consistent across disagreement and agreement 
cases.  Arguably then, we additionally need to seek an alternative way to understand the EWV in 
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 This kind of result gains independent support from Condorcet‟s (1785) Jury Theorem.  Condorcet showed that 
if members of a jury i) were each more than 0.5 reliable at making the correct judgement, ii) each made their 
individual judgements independently and iii) revealed their own judgement truthfully when the group voted, 
then two consequences follow.  Firstly, the probability of the majority making a correct judgement on the issue 
is greater than any one individual making a correct judgement, and secondly, as the number of individuals in the 
group increases, the probability of the majority making the correct judgement approaches 1.  This lends 
independent support to the thesis that the agreement of epistemic peers is a reliable indicator of the truth of a 
proposition, assuming the three conditions are met. 
30
 Many thanks to Allan Hazlett for clarifying this point. 
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terms for belief revision following disagreement, albeit one which returns similar results to „splitting 
the difference‟ in paradigm disagreement cases such as PERCEPTION and RESTAURANT. 
4.0 The Equal Weight View and Commutativity 
In this chapter I consider the implications of the EWV when applied in diachronic cases.  Although 
the literature makes no claims to address instances of extended disagreement, I think that any 
reasonable account of belief-revision should surely be generally applicable rather than restricted in 
application to one-off synchronic cases.  Despite my arguments in the previous chapter that we should 
seek an alternative method for belief revision, in the absence of a suitable alternative I continue to 
apply the EWV as „splitting the difference‟ here.  Although not ideal, it does return the „correct‟ 
results in a number of paradigm disagreement cases and so will serve as a suitable proxy.  In the 
concluding chapter I will sketch some preliminary thoughts as to what an alternative mechanism for 
belief revision might look like. 
My hypothesis throughout this chapter is that the EWV fails to respect the following principle: 
The Commutativity of Evidence Principle (CEP):  „To the extent that what it is 
reasonable for one to believe depends on one‟s total evidence, historical facts about 
the order in which that evidence is acquired [should] make no difference to what it is 
reasonable for one to believe‟ (Kelly, 2008, 7, my italics) 
Feldman specifically comments on the order that people receive information in disagreement cases 
noting that the „order in which one gets one‟s evidence on the topic makes no difference in cases like 
this‟ (2007, 204).  Now, whilst this does seem uncontroversial for the first order evidence in support 
of the proposition in question, in this chapter I want to look specifically at situations in which it is the 
higher order evidence about what one‟s epistemic peers believe which is causing the change in belief 
each time.  Here it does seem that the order in which peers, and therefore higher order evidence is 
encountered can play a role in resultant belief.   
 
I begin this chapter by motivating my reasons for accepting a version of CEP. I then consider an 
objection due to Wilson (2010) relating to the interaction between applications of the EWV following 
disagreement, and conditionalization on other evidence.  Ultimately, I argue that these kinds of cases 
are unproblematic for the view.  Despite this, I think there is a further worry that diachronic 
applications of the EWV fail to respect commutativity.  To show this I begin by asking whether 
epistemic peers‟ beliefs can effectively cancel each other out, initially considering the case of an 
epistemic agent confronted by a single epistemic peer whose belief changes with time, and then 
extending the case to consider the same agent when confronted by two peers with beliefs which are 
equally far from the agent‟s own belief, but in opposing directions.  The remainder and focus of this 
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chapter is then concerned with whether the order in which epistemic peers (and therefore, higher order 
evidence) are encountered can and should affect an agent‟s resulting credence.   
 
4.1 The Commutativity of Evidence Principle (CEP) 
 
In short, CEP represents the requirement that the order in which evidence is encountered make no 
difference to the resulting belief.
31
  Some conciliationists may be committed to CEP purely in virtue of 
their prior commitment to the Uniqueness Thesis (UT).
32
  To recap, UT says that given a body of 
evidence for some proposition P, there is a uniquely reasonable doxastic attitude to take towards P.  It 
follows that if two people share the same total evidence, then they should have the same belief.  Hence 
even if the two peers receive the same evidence but in the different order, the net result is that they still 
have the same evidence, and hence should still have the same belief. So UT entails CEP.   
Although I think there are ways to motivate the principle independently of UT, see for example Kelly 
(2008, 614-619), I also recognise that it may not be automatically irrational for two agents who receive 
the same evidence in a different order to end up with different degrees of belief.  This may just be as a 
fact about the way in which we assess evidence and counter-evidence for our beliefs.  Despite this I 
also think that once an agent becomes aware that their beliefs are susceptible to order differences in 
this way they should act to compensate.  For example, having read Kelly‟s (2008) paper, I should now 
seek to compensate for the bias that results from the order in which I first encounter evidence by 
paying equal attention to evidence which counts in favour and against my beliefs.  In effect, the CEP is 
an idealized principle; an ideally rational agent‟s beliefs should not be affected by the order in which 
evidence is encountered. Even if we do in fact sometimes respond to evidence in an uneven way, it 
still isn‟t desirable that we do. I think any reasonable account of disagreement should respect CEP and 
in the remainder of the chapter I go on to discuss various ways in which the EWV might fail to do so, 
assuming throughout that the subjects discussed are aware of such a potential bias in their assessment 
of evidence and wish to act to correct it. 
 4.2 Conditionalization and Commutativity 
Generally, epistemic agents who adopt the EWV will update their beliefs by a) averaging out 
credence‟s with epistemic peers when they learn of disagreements and b) conditionalizing based on 
                                                          
31
 This principle has received much attention in the Bayesian Epistemology literature where it is widely 
accepted. Jeffrey (1983) proposed a method for conditionalizing upon new evidence which, unlike traditional 
conditionalization, allowed agents to update their beliefs based on incomplete or uncertain information.  
Unfortunately, Jeffrey Conditionalization fails to respect commutativity, a result which Doring describes as „an 
embarrassment against which a rational agent will want to safeguard‟ (1999, 384).     
32
 This connection between Uniqueness and Commutativity was suggested to me by Allan Hazlett in 
conversation.  It relies upon the metaphysical assumption that the order of acquisition of evidence doesn‟t 
destroy the identity of a body of evidence. 
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other evidence. I begin by considering an objection due to Wilson (2010) resulting directly from a 
perceived failure of commutativity between applications of the EWV, and updating in light of other 
evidence.
33
  He claims that „in general, the combination of conditionalization on other evidence and 
application of the equal weight view by epistemic peers will not satisfy the requirement of 
commutativity‟ (2010, 323).  Hence, the credence‟s that the agents will end up with will depend on 
the order in which they receive new evidence and learn of disagreements.   
He asks us to consider the following case:  Two epistemic peers have equal access to information 
about coin tossing dynamics and bias distributions.  Based on this evidence, they come to different 
conclusions about the bias of a coin.  One thinks that the bias towards heads is 80% likely, the other 
20% likely.  Both are sure that the coin is fair, or it is biased in such a way that it lands heads each 
time; these are the only two options.  Wilson‟s claim is that, the EWV predicts a difference in the final 
credence for the two agents depending upon whether the coin is tossed first, or they confer first.   
CASE 1:  The Agents Compare First (EWV then Conditionalize)
34
: 
At t1, the agents discuss their beliefs and on the basis of the disagreement, the EWV kicks in.  Both 
therefore end up with credence 0.5 that the coin is biased. 
At t2, the coin is tossed and comes up heads.  The agents both conditionalize on this new information, 
giving a resulting credence of: 0.5/((0.5+0.5(1-0.5)) = 0.666… 
CASE 2:  The Coin is Tossed First (Conditionalize then EWV): 
At t1, the coin is tossed and comes up heads.  This evidence supports the hypothesis that the coin is 
biased towards heads.  Both agents conditionalize their existing credence‟s on this new information, 
giving the following resulting credence‟s: 
Agent 1:  0.8/((0.8+0.5(1-0.8)) = 0.888… 
Agent 2: 0.2/((0.2+0.5(1-0.2)) = 0.333… 
At t2, the agents then discuss their beliefs, discover that they disagree, and apply the EWV, giving a 
resulting credence of 0.611111 that the coin is biased.  Wilson goes on to demonstrate that other 
initial credence distributions that average to 0.5 (0.9 and 0.1 for example) are similarly problematic.  
In fact, he shows that, if agents compare views first as in Case 1, their credence‟s will always go to 
0.6666…, regardless of their initial divergence.  If however, they flip the coin first, then their final 
                                                          
33
 Similar objections are considered by Shogenji (2007) and Fitelson and Jehle (2009). Shogenji notes that for 
this objection to work, we first need to make two assumptions; i)  An agent‟s degrees of confidence are 
probabilistically coherent and ii)  An agent‟s degrees of belief are updated in accordance with the Bayesian rule 
of conditionalization when new evidence is received (2007, 17). 
34
 All calculations in this section are taken from Wilson (2010, 324) 
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credence‟s will vary between 0.5 and 0.6666 depending on how far their initial credence‟s varied. The 
end result when comparing first will always be different from the end result when flipping first.
35
  The 
order in which evidence is received leads to a different resultant belief, and the greater the initial 
disagreement, the higher the failure in commutativity.  
By way of response, I am unconvinced there is any difficulty here as the cases stand.  In both Cases 1 
and 2 above, the disagreement is regarding whether the coin is biased or not.  However, in Case 1, the 
agents become aware of their disagreement at t1, their shared evidence is therefore all the evidence 
they had both considered in reaching their original credence.  What happens after the disagreement 
(i.e. the coin being tossed) is irrelevant to the disagreement; it would only become relevant if then at 
time t3, they discussed their respective credence‟s again.  In Case 2 however, the agents become 
aware of their disagreement at t2.  At t2, their shared evidence is all the evidence they had at t1 and 
the fact that the coin landed heads when tossed.  In effect, Wilson is drawing a conclusion from two 
cases where the agents have different evidence available to them at the point of disagreement, and 
arguing that the different resulting credences are problematic.  However, differing credences are just 
what we should expect if the agent‟s beliefs are sufficiently responsive to the evidence as it changes.  
Hence Wilson‟s argument here does not provide a counter-example to CEP. 
4.3 Diachronic Disagreement between Two Peers  
My focus in the remainder of the chapter is on diachronic applications of the EWV itself. The first 
case I want to consider is one in which an agent receives higher-order evidence which points in 
opposite directions: 
Suppose we have two epistemic peers, Tom and Max.  At t0, based purely on the first-
order evidence, e, Tom forms a high credence that God exists (0.8) and Max has a low 
credence in the same proposition (0.2).  At t1, they discover their disagreement, the 
EWV kicks in, and both revise their credence to 0.5.  At t2 (a month later say) they 
fall into discussion again, and Max says that he now believes that God exists with a 
high credence (0.8). 
So what should Tom believe now?  At t2, the only reason that Tom is currently in a position of 
agnosticism (0.5) is that Max, an epistemic peer, disagreed with him at t1.  If at t2 the same epistemic 
peer is now agreeing with Tom‟s original belief, then assuming they remain epistemic peers, isn‟t 
Tom reasonable in once again believing that God exists and furthermore, reasonable in believing this 
with his original credence?  The thought here is that his only evidence for thinking otherwise, namely 
Max‟s disagreement, is effectively cancelled out by Max‟s change in belief. 
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 An exception is when the agents start with the same credence, but then here, there is no disagreement in the 
first place (2010, 324) 
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Before answering that question, let‟s see what the EWV suggests should happen at t2.  At this point, 
Tom‟s current credence is 0.5, and Max‟s 0.8, so assuming they are still peers they converge to 0.65, 
0.15 degrees below Tom‟s original belief at 0.8.
36
   But are they still peers at t2?  To answer this 
question, we need to know why Max has changed his belief.  There are two options; either i) Max has 
the same evidence at t2 as he had at t1, or ii) Max has new evidence at t2.  Taking (ii) first, this new 
evidence could be in the form of new first-order evidence; he read a new textbook for example.  
Alternatively, perhaps it is new higher-order evidence; he spoke to one or more different epistemic 
peer(s) who believed in God and revised his belief upwards accordingly, or a combination of both.  
But, if Max has new evidence which Tom doesn‟t have then they may not be epistemic peers at t2, so 
the EVW doesn‟t apply.  
So what instead of (i)? Perhaps Max just reasoned further on the existing evidence and the arguments 
Tom put forward for his belief; on reflection, he is now convinced that the evidence is more in favour 
of God‟s existence than not.  This raises a further question; does a peer‟s reasoning count as further 
evidence?  Should Tom take both Max‟s original and new beliefs into account, or should he only ever 
take into account Max‟s most up-to-date belief?  
If Tom encountered different peers at t1 and t2 then Tom would be required to take both beliefs into 
account.   This is because both peers provide him with some new higher-order evidence, namely their 
respective beliefs.  So, assume Max‟s reasoning on the same evidence for longer also qualifies as new 
higher-order evidence for his peers. If so, then Tom has received two pieces of information from the 
same peer. At t1, he learnt that a peer had formed a low credence based on some evidence, E.  Then at 
t2, he learnt that the same peer had formed a high credence based upon E+, (the original evidence, the 
higher-order evidence that a peer (Tom) had a high credence based upon E, and further reasoning 
about E).  So perhaps Tom should take both credences into account in revising his own belief at t2. 
However I want to argue that Tom should in fact discount Max‟s original credence at t1 as this is now 
effectively redundant; Max will build his old belief into his updated belief at t2.  Elga (2007, 505) 
comments on precisely this type of scenario, one in which you have re-evaluated an earlier claim that 
you previously rejected, and which, were it not for your past belief, you would now regard as true.  
Effectively, Max at t2 disagrees with his earlier self at t1, and hence needs to determine which self he 
would expect to be right in this sort of disagreement.  Factors which might affect the answer include 
whether he discovered a mistake in his old reasoning.  If so, then he should discount his old answer as 
he wasn‟t a peer at t1. Elga is saying here that Max will build his old credence into his updated belief.  
Tom should therefore just discount Max‟s old belief and just update based on what he would have 
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 In fact, it is impossible for Max alone to get Tom back to 0.8 at t2 as to do so, he would need a belief of 1.1 
((1.1+0.5)/2) = 0.8), and this is impossible; no agent can have a degree of belief greater than 1. 
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believed at t1 had Max‟s credence been 0.8 and hence, return to a credence of at least 0.8
37
. To do 
otherwise would be to be in danger of double-counting Max‟s belief at t1.   
In fact, regardless of which is correct here, it is not obvious that Max is Tom‟s peer in this scenario.  
Remember that on Elga‟s definition of peerhood, EP4, in order for two people to be peers they each 
have to consider each other to be equally likely to be mistaken in the event of a disagreement.  If Max 
just started believing P (having previously believed not-p and having after that been agnostic) then 
surely this type of erratic belief changing is an indication to Tom that Max is unlikely to be correct, 
and hence Tom may feel that they are no longer peers.  However, in this case Tom wasn‟t obliged to 
suspend belief in the first place; Max was never his epistemic peer.  So Tom is certainly permitted to 
return to his original credence (0.8) at t2. 
4.4 Does Higher Order evidence affect Peerhood? 
The above section raises the following question; is higher-order evidence included in the „shared 
evidence‟ so often referred to in definitions of epistemic peerhood?  Could someone fail to be your 
peer on the basis that they had failed to talk to the same peers that you had?  Shogenji defines an 
epistemic peer as „someone who possesses the same empirical evidence on the issue as one does, and 
who possesses the same level of relevant epistemic competence as one does‟ (2007, 2).  This certainly 
suggests that higher-order evidence does not contribute towards peerhood.  Other definitions are less 
clear.  For example, Kelly states that „they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the 
evidence and arguments which bear on that question‟ (2005, 177). One reason for this lack of clarity 
may just be that it isn‟t really an issue until we consider the type of extended cases I‟m looking at in 
this chapter. 
 
In fact, I think it is fairly obvious that higher-order evidence should play a role in determining 
peerhood.  When we learn we disagree with a peer and we also learn that part of the reason why that 
peer holds a certain belief (say not-P) is that they have spoken to several peers with the same belief, 
this is likely to cause us to become more confident that (not-P).  After all, had we spoken to those 
peers ourselves we would have become less confident that P.  It follows that in order for two people to 
qualify as peers they need to share both first-order and higher-order evidence; their total evidence 
needs to be the same.  This is a very strong requirement and has the unfortunate result that any two 
people who haven‟t come into contact with exactly the same peers would immediately fail to be peers.  
For this reason, I want to suggest that we weaken the requirement slightly and allow that two people 
can be peers if they have similar evidence, even if this isn‟t identical evidence. 
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 I say „at least‟ here, as following discussion in the previous chapter, there may be reason to think that Max 
and Tom‟s agreement in confidence at 0.8 gives them reason to revise their confidence upwards. 
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In reality, it is extremely unusual for two peers to even have identical first-order evidence.  Even in 
cases like PERCEPTION the two peers have similar but not identical evidence.  My belief is 
something like „from this angle, it looks like Mike is across the street‟ and my friend‟s belief is „from 
this (slightly different) angle, it looks like James is across the street‟.  On my previous definition, we 
can only be peers if we share evidence. If we don‟t, then we are no longer peers, and hence, there is 
no rational requirement to alter our beliefs when we disagree.
38
 There seem to be two distinct ways in 
which two agents can be said to share evidence in a way which qualifies them for peerhood.  On the 
one hand, two agents can be peers with respect to some proposition P if they have similar evidence, in 
the sense that the evidence is equally good.  This seems to be what is going on in PERCEPTION. 
Barring any obstructions in the middle of the street, the agent‟s evidence is equally good; neither is 
better positioned than the other to determine who is across the street. 
 
On the other hand, two peers can have different tokens of the same evidence. So, if I read in the 
Guardian that P, and my peer reads in a different copy of the Guardian that P, then we have identical 
evidence, despite the fact that the source of our evidence was different
39
.  This seems to correspond to 
what is going on in RESTAURANT-A.  Although the two peers do the calculation independently, the 
calculation itself is the same, and so each peer has a different token of the same type of evidence.  
Their evidence is in some sense identical.  Higher-order evidence, even if received from different 
peers, also qualifies as identical evidence.  If I speak to four peers who all believe that P, and my peer 
speaks to a different four peers who also all believe that P, then we have exactly the same, and hence 
identical higher-order evidence, even if it doesn‟t come from the same sources.  Our evidence is 
literally the same, and not merely similar as it would be in PERCEPTION
40
.   
 
In conclusion, the peerhood requirement should be weakened so as to allow that two people can be 
peers if they share at least similar evidence, evidence which is equally likely to lead them to the 
correct conclusion regarding P.  I want to allow that if I have spoken to a peer (P1) with degree of 
belief 0.6, and a friend has spoken to a different peer (P2) also with degree of belief 0.6, then we have 
identical evidence and remain peers, even though P1 may not be the same person as P2.  This re-
interpretation has the advantage that it fits with Elga‟s definition of peerhood, EP4.  If two people 
                                                          
38
 Perceptual cases are often used to motivate arguments that suggest that peer disagreement should lead an 
agent to suspend belief in a proposition.  However, what I think the above discussion shows is that perceptual 
cases are first and foremost cases of testimony, and not straightforward disagreement.  Any disagreement that 
arises is prior to the evidence being fully shared. Once new first-order evidence is provided, via the testimony of 
an epistemic peer and evidence is fully shared, then agreement, usually as suspended judgement, quickly 
follows.  This differs from more interesting cases where the agents share all the evidence and still persist in 
disagreeing. 
39
 Thanks to Allan Hazlett for suggesting this example. 
40
 This becomes slightly less obvious in the degrees of belief case.  If I speak to two peers with credences 0.7 
and 0.8 that P, and my friend speaks to two peers with credences 0.6 and 0.9, does this qualify as the same 
evidence?  Again, arguably yes. Both of us have spoken to two peers who believe that P, and in each case, our 
peer‟s credences average to 0.75. It does seem that my total evidence would be the same in both cases. 
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have similarly good but not identical evidence, they are still equally likely to be mistaken and hence, 
they are peers. 
 
4.5 Diachronic Disagreements between Multiple Peers 
 
I now want to consider what would happen if we add a third peer to the case in Section 4.3.   What if 
Tom first encounters Max at t1, and then instead of re-encountering Max at t2 he encounters a 
different peer, Jane?  And how important is the order in which Max and Jane are encountered in 
determining Tom‟s resulting credence at t2?  To explore these questions assume that at t0 Tom and 
Jane have the same starting credence that God exists (0.8)
41
 and Max has credence (0.2) in the same 
proposition.  All three consider each other to be peers in line with EP4 and all credences are based on 
exactly the same first order evidence, e, relevant to the proposition that „God Exists‟. Synchronically, 
the EWV suggests that the reasonable credence on discovering their disagreement here would be 
(0.6)
42
.  Diachronically however, the following two cases are possible:  
Case A: Tom encounters Max and then Jane 
t1)    Tom (0.8) encounters Max (0.2), they apply the EWV and both move to credence 0.5. 
t2)    i) Tom (0.5) encounters Jane (0.8). Tom shares his additional evidence (Max‟s initial 
credence) with Jane to restore peerhood.  Jane revises her credence to 0.5 on the basis 
of this new evidence. 
ii)  Having now fully shared their evidence and as a result of their agreement, both 
remain at credence 0.5. 
Case B: Tom encounters Jane and then Max 




t2*) i*) Tom (0.8) encounters Max (0.2).  Tom shares his additional evidence (Jane‟s 
initial credence) with Max to restore peerhood.  Max revises his credence to 0.5 on 
the basis of this new evidence. 
                                                          
41
 Though note as discussed in Chapter 3, they need not share the same credence to agree about the all-or-
nothing proposition. 
42
 (0.8+0.8+0.2)/3 = 0.6 
43
 Following my discussion in Chapter 3, we could alternatively say that both raise their confidence slightly 
following their agreement in (t2ii) and (t1*).  Even with this adjustment, Tom‟s resulting credences at (t2ii) and 
(t2ii*) would still be different (assuming that disagreements were still recognised by splitting the difference).   
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 ii*) Having now fully shared their evidence, Tom (0.8) and Max (0.5) apply the EWV 
and move to credence 0.65. 
The three peers are identical in both the diachronic and synchronic cases, and at t0 all share the same 
first-order evidence, which remains unchanged throughout each case.  But in the synchronic case Tom 
ends up with credence 0.6 that P.  However in the diachronic case despite encountering the same 
peers, he ends up with a different credence, and worse, this credence varies with the order in which 
those peers were encountered (0.5 or 0.65).  
 
Taking the diachronic cases first of all, the difference in resultant beliefs here can be attributed to the 
fact that Tom doesn‟t have the same evidence in (t2) as in (t2*) despite encountering exactly the same 
peers in both cases.  In Case A, his total evidence at (t2ii) comprises e, a peer with credence 0.2 and a 
peer with credence 0.8.  In Case B, his total evidence at (t2*ii) comprises e, a peer with credence 0.8, 
and a peer with credence 0.5. It follows that Tom (A) and Tom (B) don‟t have similar evidence at 
(t2ii) and (t2ii*) respectively.  Hence whilst it might be difficult to say who is better placed to 
adjudicate on P, this is not a direct failure of CEP. This kind of case demonstrates the difficulties 
involved in retaining identical or even similar evidence diachronically.  Even if based upon the first-
order evidence, multiple agents count as peers, as soon as some variation in the order in which they 
are encountered is introduced, they cease to have even similar total evidence, and hence their resulting 
beliefs will differ.   
I end this section by considering a case in which Tom does have similar evidence at (t2) and (t2*) and 
asking whether this still provides a counter-example to CEP. Here (P1 – P6) just represent six of 
Tom‟s peers at t0, all of whom share the same first-order evidence, e. 
Case C:  Tom encounters a peer with credence 0.6, and then a peer with credence 0.4. 
t0: The peers‟ respective credence‟s based upon the evidence, e, are as follows:  Tom = 
0.6, P1 = 0.6, P2 = 0.2, P3 = 0.6 
t1: Tom (0.6) encounters P1 (0.6).   They are epistemic peers as both share the same 
evidence, e.  They therefore apply the EWV and both remain at credence 0.6. 
Separately, at t1, P2 (0.2) encounters P3 (0.6).  They are epistemic peers as both share the same 
evidence, e.  They therefore apply the EWV and move to credence 0.4. 
t2: Tom (0.6) encounters P2 (0.4).  At this stage, both have evidence e, and both have 
encountered an epistemic peer with credence 0.6, they thus have similar higher-order 




Case D:  Tom encounters a peer with credence 0.4, and then a peer with credence 0.6. 
t0*:  The respective credence‟s based on evidence, e, are as follows:  Tom = 0.6, P4 = 0.4, 
P5 = 0.8, P6 = 0.4 
t1*: Tom (0.6) encounters P4 (0.4).  They are epistemic peers as both share the same 
evidence, e.  They apply the EWV and move to credence 0.5. 
Separately, at t1*, P5 (0.8) encounters P6 (0.4).  They are epistemic peers as both share the same 
evidence, e.  They therefore apply the EWV and move to credence 0.6. 
t2*:  Tom (0.5) encounters P5 (0.6).  At this stage, both have evidence e, and both have 
encountered a peer with credence 0.4, they thus share similar higher-order evidence 
and remain epistemic peers.  They apply the EWV and move to credence 0.55. 
Tom‟s resulting credence at t2 having encountered a peer with credence 0.6 followed by a peer with 
credence 0.4 is 0.5.  In t2* however, having encountered a peer with credence 0.4 followed by a peer 
with credence 0.6, his resulting credence is 0.55.  The order has led to a different resulting credence.  
This time, although he still doesn‟t have identical evidence at t2 and t2*, Tom does have similar 
evidence.  In both C and D, his total evidence at this stage is the first-order evidence e, a peer with 
credence 0.4 and a peer with credence 0.6.  So here, we do have a failure of the CEP.  The same agent 
with similar total evidence has a different resultant credence depending on the order in which that 
evidence is encountered.   
Despite this, it could still be argued that at t2 and t2* Tom‟s evidence is not sufficiently similar to 
constitute a counter-example to CEP. To see why, we need to look in detail at the composition of the 
total evidence in each case
44
: 
Evidence C Evidence D 
C1) The first order evidence, e. 
C2) A peer's credence that p = 0.6 on the basis of 
e, call this e+. 
C3) A peer's credence that p = 0.4 on the basis of 
e +, call this e++. 
 
D1) The first order evidence, e 
D2) A peer's credence that p = 0.4 on the basis of 
e, call this e* 
D3) A peer's credence that p = 0.6 on the basis of 
e*, call this e**. 
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The problem arises as Evidence C and Evidence D aren‟t just the same three elements in a different 
order.  Although (C1) = (D1), it isn‟t the case that either (D3) = (C2) or that (D2) = (C3).  Whilst 
similar, for example (C2) and (D3) both say that a peer‟s credence that P is 0.6, the total body of 
evidence in play at each stage is different, and hence what is meant by peerhood is also slightly 
different.  Whilst still undesirable for the EWV, this is not a direct failure of CEP, and perhaps the 
marginal difference in resulting credence in the two cases (0.5) and (0.55) can just be attributed to the 
fact that the evidence is similar, rather than identical. 
4.6 Treating Diachronic cases Synchronically. 
 
Cases A and B highlight that diachronic applications of the EWV may result in a loss of identity of 
evidence, with a corresponding loss of peerhood.  Cases C and D illustrate that even with similar 
evidence, diachronic applications of the EWV may also result in a failure of commutativity. Even if 
ultimately it is argued that these results arise from a difference in evidence and hence don‟t constitute 
a counter-example to CEP this still seems an undesirable outcome.  We don‟t want contingent facts 
about the order in which we encounter our peers to affect our beliefs in this way.  So is there any way 
for an epistemic agent to guard against these results, and ensure that the diachronic cases return the 
same result as (relatively unproblematic) synchronic cases?   
One possibility would be to stipulate that whenever an agent encountered a new peer the rational 
attitude to adopt regarding P would be the average of beliefs based purely upon the first-order 
evidence, e, not taking account of any higher-order evidence which had been received in the 
meantime.  So at t2, rather than updating based upon his belief as it was at t1, Tom should just update 
his belief as though he had received all the information (namely, Max and Jane‟s initial credences) 
simultaneously at t0.  Each time a new peer is encountered, an agent should update by averaging 
based upon what their belief would have been, had they encountered all the peers (and therefore, 
higher order evidence) simultaneously.  The attitudes that matter therefore, are the attitudes based 
only on the original first-order evidence.  This certainly seems to be Kelly‟s (2010) understanding of 
what the EWV implies for cases of disagreement (agreement) with multiple peers:  
„the proponent of the Equal Weight View will insist that, at time t2, what one is 
rationally required to believe is determined by averaging the original opinions of the 
two peers; moreover, if, at an even later time t3, one becomes aware of the opinion 
of a third peer, then what one is rationally required to believe will be determined by 
averaging the original opinions of the three peers; […] In general, for any time tn, a 
proponent of the Equal Weight View will hold that what one is rationally required to 




A worry here is that if we are only concerned with taking into account the original opinions of our 
epistemic peers based purely on the first-order evidence then this fails to take account of other higher-
order evidence which other peers have in turn received from disagreements or agreements with further 
peers which have not been encountered by the agent in question.  If we only consider people‟s 
original beliefs, then this evidence falls out which contradicts Kelly‟s own assertion that the two kinds 
of evidence, first-order and higher-order, qualify in exactly the same way in determining reasonable 
beliefs (2010, 133).  To illustrate this, consider the following case: 
Tom‟s original belief based on the first-order evidence is 0.8 at t0. He then meets a 
Jane whose original belief at t0 was also 0.8.  However, Jane has since spoken to 
Adam at t1 whose belief was 0.2, and hence revised her belief to 0.5 which is where it 
stands when she encounters Tom at t2.  Tom has never met Adam.  So when Tom 
meets Jane at t2, does he revise to (0.8+0.8)/2 = 0.8, or does he revise to (0.5+0.8)/2 = 
0.65?  If it is only her original belief we are concerned with, then it seems any higher-
order evidence picked up along the way just falls out.  All Tom should be interested in 
is Jane‟s belief at t0. 
It therefore seems that Kelly‟s reading of the EWV is too simplistic; we need to be more specific.  If 
you and the peer you are disagreeing with have encountered only the same epistemic peers, then in 
diachronic cases you should both update your beliefs by taking the average of what your belief would 
be had you encountered all those peers simultaneously.  However, if you have both encountered 
different peers, then it seems you should want to take this information into account as well.  Hence, 
having shared this information, you should just average your current beliefs.  From being what 
appeared a very simple rule for belief updating in the case of one-off disagreements between two 
epistemic peers, it seems the EWV when applied as weighted-averaging quickly becomes very 
complex to apply as both time and multiple peers are added to the mix. 
5.0 Conclusion 
This paper has undertaken a detailed investigation of Elga‟s (2007) Equal Weight View, its 
relationship to other conciliatory positions, and its consequences when understood as a view requiring 
a weighted average approach to belief revision.  The traditional disagreement debate has been 
extended to include agreement cases and to consider not only synchronic but also diachronic 
applications of the view.  This approach has resulted in new and often unexpected problems, 
summarized below. 
Having clarified the relationship between all-or-nothing and degrees of belief, the main result in 
Chapter 2 was that an all-or-nothing attitude of „suspending judgement‟ turned out not to be 
equivalent to degree of belief 0.5 after all. Three possible understandings of suspending judgement 
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were differentiated; broad, intermediate and narrow, and it was argued that suspending judgement was 
better understood in an intermediate sense represented by an interval of credences, with the size of the 
interval informed by the amount and quality of available evidence and the distance between the 
respective peer‟s credences prior to disagreement. 
In Chapter 3 I argued that all conciliationists should be committed to peer agreement raising 
confidence. Although consistent with the spirit of the EWV, the view fails to return this result when 
understood to require „splitting the difference‟.  I suggested that agreement cases can display an 
ambiguity when determining which proposition is under consideration, which can in turn lead to it 
being under-determined as to whether peers are agreeing or disagreeing.  In agreement cases it only 
makes sense to „split the difference‟ when credences are read as representing beliefs about 
probabilities, and yet this interpretation was explicitly ruled out in Chapter 2.  It followed that belief 
revision qua weighted averaging should be restricted in application to disagreement cases, if at all. 
A move to a diachronic framework in Chapter 4 resulted in a need to clarify what it is for peers to 
share evidence, with a resulting weakening in the peerhood condition to allow for similar if not 
identical evidence.  Having argued that any reasonable account of disagreement should respect the 
commutativity of evidence, I demonstrated that diachronic applications of the EWV give rise to 
different resultant beliefs when compared with synchronic cases involving the same peers and first-
order evidence and furthermore that the resulting beliefs differed depending on the order in which 
peers were encountered.  This was ultimately explained by the fact that in encountering the same 
peers in different orders, an agent could actually end up with different higher-order evidence, and 
hence commutativity was not violated.  However, a modified case in which both first-order and 
higher-order evidence was shared still resulted in different beliefs. Again, this difference was 
dependent only on the order in which the higher-order evidence was encountered; a result which I 
concluded was unacceptable for the EWV.  I ended the chapter by suggesting that one way in which 
to avoid these problems was to update diachronic beliefs „as if‟ the evidence had been encountered 
synchronically. 
What became clear throughout the paper is that understanding the EWV as requiring „weighted 
averaging‟ is an overly-simplistic approach, often inconsistent with the spirit of the view as defined 
by Elga (2007).  This conclusion is in line with the work of Shogenji (2007) and Jehle and Fitelson 
(2009) whose papers demonstrate that „weighted averaging‟, whilst desirable in terms of simplicity 
and fit with the literature, when formalized turns out to be „at best incomplete, and at worst 
synchronically incoherent‟ (ibid, 284).  Going forward then, the challenge is to find a principled way 
to apply the EWV across all types of cases, disagreement and agreement, synchronic and diachronic. 
It would also be interesting to revisit the objections which have been raised against the EWV to date 
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and determine the extent to which their success  rests on the assumption that the EWV is to be applied 
as weighted averaging.  
Although I have stopped short of proposing a positive alternative here, I want to end by briefly 
suggesting some plausible restrictions on any suitable candidate.  Most obviously, any mechanism for 
belief revision should respect the spirit of the EWV, which I take to be that our peer‟s beliefs should 
act as a check upon our own beliefs. Also desirable although perhaps less essential is that the 
mechanism preserve peerhood and identity (or similarity) of evidence diachronically, such that an 
agent would have the same resulting credence regardless of the order in which peers were 
encountered.  Finally, one candidate which can be ruled out is any mechanism for belief revision 
based upon some fixed value which is added to an agent‟s credence following agreement and 
subtracted following disagreement.  For example, if an agent was required to add 0.05 to his credence 
for each agreeing peer encountered then he could potentially reach a credence greater than 1, which is 
impossible.  Agreement should cause beliefs to approach but never reach 1.  Additionally, a fixed 
figure would take no account of the extent of the disagreement.  Intuitively, we want peers who are at 
opposite extremes of the scale to be required to make more extensive revisions than those whose 
credences fall close; we want belief revision to factor in the proximity of a peer‟s credence in 
determining how an agent‟s belief should be revised.  In conclusion, any belief revision candidate 
should be a function of i) an agent‟s credence, ii) its proximity to the peer‟s credence and iii) 
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